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October 21, 2008
Finance & Economics, Financial Crisis, In Other Words
(Few people will escape from this crisis with enough reputability to scream “I told you so” at the top of their lungs like hedge fund neophyte Andrew Lahde. In this epilogue to his one year experiment in asset management – during which time his fund returned 866% betting on the subprime collapse – he rails on the industry, its myopic leadership, the vice of greed, and even the virtues of a little green plant…)
Dear Investor:
Today I write not to gloat. Given the pain that nearly everyone is experiencing, that would be entirely inappropriate. Nor am I writing to make further predictions, as most of my forecasts in previous letters have unfolded or are in the process of unfolding. Instead, I am writing to say goodbye.
Recently, on the front page of Section C of the Wall Street Journal, a hedge fund manager who was also closing up shop (a $300 million fund), was quoted as saying, “What I have learned about the hedge fund business is that I hate it.” I could not agree more with that statement. I was in this game for the money. The low hanging fruit, i.e. idiots whose parents paid for prep school, Yale, and then the Harvard MBA, was there for the taking. These people who were (often) truly not worthy of the education they received (or supposedly received) rose to the top of companies such as AIG, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and all levels of our government. All of this behavior supporting the Aristocracy, only ended up making it easier for me to find people stupid enough to take the other side of my trades. God bless America.
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Published by The Editor on October 21st, 2008
October 12, 2008
In Other Words
(As finance ministers from around the world congregate in Washington D.C. this weekend, various “solutions” will be floated that either compliment, contradict, or completely ignore America’s best efforts to fix its broken banking system. Coordination will be critical to preventing a protracted global recession, and Paulson and Bernanke’s ambitious plan – as examined below by a pair of Senior Fellows from the Brookings Institution – will either be the first step toward rational intrabank lending, or the final nail in the coffin of deregulated financial services…)
Making the Rescue Package Work: Asset and Equity Purchases
The Brookings Institution, October 10, 2008
If the main purpose of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 is to give banks confidence in each other, then enabling Treasury directly to bolster the capital positions of banks that need more capital may be an even more effective way to restoring confidence to the inter-bank market than the purchased of troubled assets. Whatever Congress may have intended about the pricing of the distressed assets, it also authorized a much more direct way to recapitalize the financial system and weak banks in particular: direct purchases by Treasury of securities that individual institutions may wish to issue to bolster their capital. At this writing, Treasury reportedly is considering ways do this. In this essay, we outline a specific bank recapitalization plan for Treasury to consider.
In particular, Treasury could announce its willingness to entertain applications for capital injections, using a set pricing formula. For publicly traded banks, Treasury could buy at the price as of a given date, such as the price one or more days before its plan was announced. For privately-owned banks, Treasury could use a price based on the average price-to-book value for publicly traded banks as of that date. To prevent government intrusion into the affairs of the banks, the stock should be non-voting. Treasury would make clear that it only would take minority positions. There should be no takeovers of more companies—AIG, Fannie and Freddie are quite enough. Treasury also should announce that it will dispose (or sell back to the bank) any stock acquired through these actions as soon as the financial system has stabilized and the bank is in sound financial condition (perhaps a time limit, such as three years, should be a working presumption).
We believe Treasury can accommodate a systematic recapitalization plan within the funding it has been given – initially $350 billion and another $350 billion later upon request to Congress (unless it disapproves) – by using the required disclosures about its asset purchases as a way of jump starting private sector pricing and trading of these securities. This should conserve Treasury’s resources it might otherwise use for asset purchases, and thus free up funds to recapitalize weak banks directly, but in an orderly fashion.
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Published by The Editor on October 12th, 2008
October 11, 2008
Finance & Economics, Financial Crisis, In Other Words
(Words of cautious wisdom from the celebrated biographer of risk, back in November of 2007…)
Crazy Little Thing Called Risk
By PETER L. BERNSTEIN
BACK when I was managing other people’s money, I had a client, a doctor, who enjoyed giving away money to his daughters. He was lucky, because an extended bull market was under way with only minor interruptions. The more he gave away, the more the market replaced what he had parted with. As generosity appeared to be a cost-free form of recreation, he considered the whole thing a riskless enterprise.
Whenever I saw my client, he immediately thanked me for making him whole after his most recent spate of giving. I always had to remind him that his gratitude was misplaced. Don’t thank me, I warned him. Thank all those nice people who are willing to pay higher prices today for the stocks you bought earlier at lower prices.
This client, who assumed that the steady multiplication of his money would continue indefinitely, without risk, keeps popping up in my memory. Although this episode happened back in the 1950s, it contains a deep truth worth exploring now, because his experience gets to the roots of what investment risk is all about.
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Published by The Editor on October 11th, 2008
October 6, 2008
Finance & Economics, Financial Crisis, History & Society, In Other Words
(”Spectacular episodes in financial history” come about more often than we might expect, and certainly more often than we remember. Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith wrote a brilliant primer on financial speculation in the early 1990s, suggesting that our memory for financial disaster was far more limited than our intelligence might otherwise suggest:
“Built into the speculative episode is the euphoria, the mass escape from reality, that excludes any serious contemplation of the true nature of what is taking place….Contributing to and supporting this euphoria are two further factors little noted in our time or in past times. The first is the extreme brevity of the financial memory. In consequence, financial disaster is quickly forgotten…”
While speculation was only the trigger in this broader financial collapse, perhaps the more important lesson will come from how we institutionalize the memory of this “mass escape from reality” and carry these lessons forward into a more stable global economy. Unfortunately, as this Economist article from 1929 points out, history is not on our side…)
Reactions of the Wall Street slump
Nov 23rd 1929 in The Economist
IT’S an ill wind that blows nobody any good. The fall of Bank rate on Thursday by another half per cent is an outward and visible sign that the dramatic and precipitous slump of the last three weeks in Wall Street has definitely relieved the pressure on the world’s money markets which the New York situation has been exerting so continuously for the last two years. Very few could have dared to hope, when Bank rate was raised to 6½ per cent on September 26th, that it would be back again at 5½ per cent in less than two months. That advance, indeed, was a by no means negligible factor in turning into the opposite direction the tide of funds which had been flowing so strongly towards New York, and in causing the edifice of American speculation to totter. But that it would collapse so completely was hardly to be expected.
The slump on the New York Stock Exchange, which has resulted in this great change in the monetary outlook, is one of the spectacular episodes of financial history. A prolonged upward movement, the extent of which is illustrated by some graphs which we print in a later column, has been built up over a series of years on the amazing and unexampled prosperity of America. But some two years ago the speculative movement seemed to lose all touch with reality; and in spite of occasionally vigorous but more often half-hearted, measures by the banking authorities of the United States, speculative fever spread throughout the nation and carried prices, mainly with the aid of borrowed money, to fantastic heights. Writing of the efforts made to check the movement, a high authority observes:
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Published by The Editor on October 6th, 2008
October 3, 2008
Finance & Economics, In Other Words, Politics & World Affairs
(As Canadians flock to the polls later this month, quietly supplying 22 percent of America’s oil and 13 percent of its natural gas, its neighbours to the south have barely noticed. Cross-border oil flows are inevitable – given that America controls of a mere 2% of the world’s oil reserves and consumes almost 25 percent of supply – and securing its long-term petroleum assumes the full participation of Alberta’s carbon-rich tar sands and the off-shore bounty at Hibernia. Even Governor Palin’s Wildlife Reserve is virtually useless without passage by pipe across Canada’s Western provinces. Given the importance of “Securing America’s Energy Future” during a twin election year, it’s surprising that talk hasn’t returned to NAFTA, cleaner energy, or agricultural subsidies.
Then again, maybe it isn’t…)
Canada’s role missed in U.S. energy debate: Yergin
By Jeffrey Jones
BANFF, Alberta (Reuters) - The way Daniel Yergin sees it, the high-stakes debate over energy security in the U.S. presidential campaign has ignored one of the most critical parts of the United States’ oil supply equation: Canada.
The United States’ neighbor to the north has quietly become its largest foreign oil and gas supplier, and that has actually improved energy security in the United States, said Yergin, energy and geopolitical analyst, Pulitzer Prize-winning author and chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates.
Meanwhile, Canada’s oil industry is struggling at home to keep boosting production of the country’s vast oil sands while facing major new environmental and cost hurdles, Yergin said.
“People debate oil imports, but what they don’t know is 22 percent of oil imports come from Canada, that 13 percent of our natural gas comes from Canada. Imports of energy from Canada need to be seen in the larger context of the trade and investment network that ties the two countries together,” he said in an interview in the mountain resort of Banff, Alberta.
“This shows interdependence at work.”
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Published by The Editor on October 3rd, 2008
September 16, 2008
Financial Crisis, History & Society, In Other Words
(Reflections on the first era of true globalization, complete with bountiful trade, unparalleled upward mobility, liquid labor markets, secure international travel, and a blissful ignorance of the fragility of this new 20th Century World Order…)
Excerpt from Economic Consequences of the Peace by John Maynard Keynes, 1919
What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in August 1914! The greater part of the population, it is true, worked hard and lived at a low standard of comfort, yet were, to all appearances, reasonably contented with this lot. But escape was possible, for any man of capacity or character at all exceeding the average, into the middle and upper classes, for whom life offered, at a low cost and with the least trouble, conveniences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages.
The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages; or he could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or information might recommend.
He could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other formality, could despatch his servant to the neighbouring office of a bank for such supply of the precious metals as might seem convenient, and could then proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of their religion, language, or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person, and would consider himself greatly aggrieved and much surprised at the least interference.
But, most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable.
The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion, which were to play the serpent to this paradise, were little more than the amusements of his daily newspaper, and appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalisation of which was nearly complete in practice.
It will assist us to appreciate the character and consequences of the peace which we have imposed on our enemies, if I elucidate a little further some of the chief unstable elements, already present when war broke out, in the economic life of Europe.
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Published by The Editor on September 16th, 2008