This TED talk by mathematician Steven Strogatz “shows how flocks of creatures (like birds, fireflies and fish) manage to synchronize and act as a unit when no one’s giving orders”. The parallels to market behavior and financial panic are implicit but obvious. We often perceive of our decisions during a crisis as unique and self-preservational, but the tendency toward spontaneous order is a powerful impulse. Coordinated reaction to natural threats, be it a hungry seal or predator hawk, can often increase a group’s biological fitness and probility of survival, while a coordinated reaction to financial crises can actually amplify individual risk – like Strogatz’s example of London’s Millenium Bridge – and only make matters worse…

Assuming that our lot in life is simply a function of hard work, acquired skills, and a bit of good luck, the only real difference between liberals and conservatives is the degree to which we believe that those who fall on hard times – for whatever reason beyond their control – deserve a helping hand. How we publicly spend on that assistance is not only a question of socio-political philosophy, but also a matter of practical statecraft. Whether “leveling the playing field” or simply “setting the rules of the game”, pharohs, kings, and presidents have all made use of their regulatory oversight with varying degrees of success. This piece in the Boston Review by noted macroeconomist Dean Baker explores the…

Faith in the underlying mechanics of portfolio theory and market efficiency has certainly contributed to humanity’s recent leap forward in wealth, productivity, private innovation, and global integration. But that same numerology has since crippled our aging financial system and triggered the worst global recession in nearly a century. Perhaps it’s time to reassess the value – and the logic – of bleeding edge finance.

As Professor Janeway points out in the following interview, treating securities like molecules, subject to the same variable distributions, “random walks”, differential equations, and reductionist math simply compounds the short-sighted actions of a few scientists-turned-gamblers. Not only does it greatly overstate the predictive power of econometric analysis, but it also understates the tremendous dangers of financial engineering.…

“Despite its severity, we believe that the slump in stock prices will prove an intermediate movement and not the precursor of a business depression…” This advice from the Harvard Economic Society on November 2, 1929 illustrates that unbridled optimism in the capital markets was just as dangerous 80 years ago as it is today. Modern financial crises aren’t simply failures of regulatory oversight or inherent structural weakness. They’re a combination of the cyclicality of human behavior, the dangers of unbridled leverage, increased speculation by unsophisticated investors, and our complete lack of financial memory beyond 20 or 30 years.

Imagine learning for the very first time — contrary to public opinion and centuries of contemporary science — that the world was actually round. Imagine being that first group of scientists (regents and spiritual leaders) or politicians (again, regents and spiritual leaders) or shell-shocked shepherds who grazed for thousands of years through the countrysides of the known world, convinced that if they wandered just a little too far, they might, in fact, fall right off the edge of the planet.

Life in those days was distinctly two-dimensional. There were the heavens, and there was the earth, and never the twain should meet. Stars were but holes in a giant celestial blanket while various pagan deities pulled the moon and the sun through…